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Introduction 
In this paper I analyze Russia’s relations with countries of Eastern Partnership (EaP) 
against the background of a wider framework of Russian neighborhood policy. What stands 
behind the emotional appeals for equality and respect, is a number of largely realist concepts of 
multipolarity, spheres of influence, great power management, and balance of power, all of them 
based on the centrality of sovereignty of great powers as the organizing principle of international 
relations. In the meantime, these concepts are complemented by regular references to the 
desirability of procedural / technical approximation between the EU and the Russia-patronized 
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), boiling down to the reiteration of the decade-long idea of a 
Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok and reducing Europe to a relatively small part of Eurasian 
geopolitical imagery. 
My analysis starts with a brief critical engagement with the conceptual underpinnings of 
Russian foreign policy, to be followed by their projection on Russia’s neighborhood policy. My 
intention is to see whether the drastic changes in Russia’s foreign policy behavior since 2014 – 
from the annexation of Crimea to a fully-fledged crisis in Russia’s relations with major Western 
institutions (the EU, NATO, G8) – were conducive to attaining the strategic goals of the Kremlin 
in the international arena. 
The paper is divided into four parts. In the first one I sketch the key elements of Russia’s 
foreign policy in general and the EU– Russia relationship in particular. In the second section I 
single out main points in Russia’s policy towards its post-Soviet neighbours. In the third part I 
identify a group of factors that influence this policy, and discuss their impact. In the fourth 
section I turn to those scarce opportunities that might be explored for the sake of avoiding further 
confrontation. 
 
Russia’s Foreign Policy Landmarks and EU-Russia Frictions 
Since the times of Evgeniy Primakov at the head of Russian diplomacy in mid-1990s, the 
driving force behind Russian foreign policy was an idea of multipolarity that became a structural 
justification for legitimizing its sphere of influence as a precondition for a world-class status and 
a role of one of major poles on the international scene. Yet in recent years the concept of 
multipolarity was put in a more critical context of debate. Many in Russian expert community in 
fact recognized that multipolarity leads to a more conflictual world, both ideologically (with 
“liberal Europe” against “conservative Russia” as a key divide) and militarily, which in practice 
explains Russia’s resort to coercive force against the EU-projected normative order 1 . The 
multipolarity lens also implies dealing with countries of common neighborhood predominantly 
through the prism of Russia’s highly complicated relations with other big players, including the 
EU. In this context, Russia’s policy of punitive reactions to what it considers unfriendly moves 
by other major players – the EU, NATO and Turkey – leaves Moscow with a rather limited 
scope of options towards its neighbors. many in the Kremlin seem to understand financial and 
political risks related to incorporating territories seceded from neighboring states with Russia, 
which works as a constraining factor for Russia’s policy. Besides, Russia’s (still hypothetical) 
consent to fully integrate South Ossetia – that is legally considered as part of Georgia by the bulk 
of the world community – would obliterate all efforts of Russia’s soft power (to be understood as 
power of attraction, as opposed to that of coercion) undertaken since 20082.  
 Against this backdrop, Russian foreign policy discourse has started shifting to a greater 
emphasis on the idea of a common European-cum-Eurasian economic space, rather than on 
multipolarity as such. Ideas of “Greater Europe” as an alleged territory of freedom of movement 
and common rules again gained popularity among Russian mainstream experts3. For the sake of 
retaining Europe as a nodal point for Russian foreign policy, some of them are ready to presume 
that the Ukraine crisis was intentionally masterminded (allegedly by Washington) to detach 
Russia from Europe4. Some signals were sent from authoritative institutions such as Russian 
International Affairs Council (RIAC) that Moscow “is interested in preserving the stability and 
the effective functioning of the EU, as well as in the moderately positive economic development 
of its member countries. Any kind of destabilization of the EU will mean increased economic, 
political and even military-political risks, particularly in Central Europe, and could also lead to                                                         
1 Karaganov, Sergey. 2016a. Novaya ideologicheskaya bor’ba? Russia in Global Affairs, April 21. 
http://www.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Novaya-ideologicheskaya-borba-18119 
2  Fenenko, Aleksei. 2016. Kart-blansh. Final igry. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 20. 
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3  Evgeny Ilyin. 2016. Why we need to build a greater Europe. Center for Continental 
Cooperation web site, February 27, available at http://greater-
europe.org/archives/578#comment-1284 
4 Karaganov, Sergey. 2016b. Ukrainskiy krizis byl razygran, chtoby otorvat’ Rossiyu ot Evropy. 
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the United States bolstering its influence in Europe. The most advantageous situation for Russia 
would be for the influence of the major players in the EU to grow, along with their ability to 
contribute to maintaining the stability and governability of countries at the periphery.“ 5  
In this framework the Kremlin tries to deal with major European actors committed to 
pragmatic, if not “business-as-usual“ approach, as exemplified by President Putin’s meeting in 
April 2016 with the German corporate elite in Moscow6. In May 2016 Putin reiterated Russia’s 
commitment to the eventual building of a zone of economic and humanitarian cooperation from 
the Atlantic to the Pacific7. The Council on Foreign and Security Policy (SVOP), a think tank 
close to the Kremlin, proposed an even broader (though very vaguely articulated) blueprint of a 
“Greater Eurasia from Lisbon to Singapore”8 – a model that envisages only a limited role to 
Europe as an associate to Eurasian institutions, as understood in Moscow.  
Russia’s renewed emphasis on reengaging with the EU for the sake of bigger 
integrationist projects is harmonious with many authoritative voices in Europe. This is the case, in particular, of the model of “tentative compatibility” proposed by the Clingendal Institute9, consonant with approaches of many Russian policy experts10 as well.11  In a recent study the Friedrich Ebert Foundation charted a future of EU – Russia relations in categories of a “shared European home” which, unlike a “common home”, does not presuppose value-based convergence.12 
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Evidently, the idea of spheres of influence might be problematic in many of these 
contexts. Russia’s verbal commitment to the common EU-Russian-Eurasian future is in sharp 
contradiction with Russia’s neighborhood policy that often boils down to preventing post-Soviet 
countries from too closely associating with the EU. Georgia appears to be a good illustration of 
this: shortly after it “ratified the AA/DCFTA, Russia introduced the Treaty on Alliance and 
Strategic Partnership with Abkhazia […] These treaties are Russia’s response to Georgia moving 
towards the EU. They are a message to other former Soviet states about the price of integrating 
with the West”13. In this reading, Russia claims its exceptionality through reserving for itself a 
role of the key communicator with the West when it comes to any integrationist project affecting 
the post-Soviet macroregion.  
 
Neighborhood and Russia’s Foreign Policy 
In this section I briefly discuss what Russia’s neighborhood policy looks like in terms of 
policy models and visions that Russia adheres to.  
Foreign policy models. For Russia, the “near abroad” is the terrain for spheres of 
influence, an indispensable condition for Russia's status of a great power in a multipolar world. 
Russia sees neighborhood as its geopolitical resource that might be helpful for great power 
management (concert of great power). Russia's ideal would be a “Europe from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok”, where major actors would negotiate among themselves and decide on major 
issues, yet (in contrast to the EU’s neighborhood policy14) with no binding normative agenda, on 
which Russia is extremely weak and sees hostile towards its interests. From Russia’s perspective 
the biggest threat is the loss of its central role in the neighborhood area. 
Vision of the neighborhood. Russia’s view of the neighbouring area is predominantly 
dichotomous, differentiating between the EU-controlled Europe and the post-Soviet space. 
Moscow sees in-between positioning of new EU associated partners (Ukraine, Moldova and 
Georgia) as a challenge to Russia’s strategy of integrating the post-Soviet republics under 
Russian-dominated EAEU. Moreover, Moscow deems that EU-type regionalism is a threat to 
both Moscow and the entire Westphalian system of national sovereignties. Region-building of 
this sort is not part of the Kremlin’s neighbourhood policy; in its stead Russia offer a top-down 
model of Eurasianism as a neo-imperial, rather than regionalism, form of association. 
                                                        
13 Paul, Amanda. 2015. The Eastern Partnership, the Russia – Ukraine war, and the Impact on 
the South Caucasus. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionale, IAI Working Papers 16/06, February. 
http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaiwp1506.pdf 
14 See chapter by Raik in this report 
Developmental models. Russia mostly supports illiberal and conservative attitudes in 
neighboring countries, and is not interested in bolstering transformative changes. In particular, 
Russia’s perspectives of influence in Ukraine depend on its relations with the ‘old guards’ of 
inert and corrupt parts of the political class15. Countries with strong conservative traditions might 
see Russia as a source of illiberal practices, as evidenced, for example, by the debate in Georgia 
in the “blasphemy law” that might defend “religious feelings” and, in fact, criminalize criticism 
of the Church.   
Foreign policy tools. Russia’s toolkit includes hard power, energy diplomacy, and 
counter-normative power - namely, Putin’s conservative project that is projected outwards in a 
form of religious diplomacy and a hybrid version of soft power that includes propaganda mixed 
with geocultural elements. The cornerstones of Russia’s counter-normative project are: a) the 
Russian world, an imagined community of allegedly and potentially kindred ethnic compatriots; 
b) civilizational constructs such as Eurasianism; and c) religious discourse exemplified by the 
concept of “holy Russia” bound together by spiritual links of politicized Orthodoxy. All three are 
relatively insensitive to the legally extant borders between state (national) jurisdictions. The very 
design of their optics allows for transcending, if not disregarding, some of these borders. Within 
the framework of the Russian world it is much easier to relativize borders between Russian 
Federation and Russian speaking communities living in neighboring countries. Through the 
prism of Eurasianism it is feasible to include Kazakhstan or Armenia in the civilizationally 
construed domain of Russian interests. The lens of religious traditionalism and conservatism 
makes possible to perceive Georgia not as a full-fledged independent nation, but rather as an 
extension / projection of Russia-patronized Orthodox ideology. 
Each of these three counter-normative elements of Russian neighborhood policy is 
grounded in the impossibility to contain national revival within Russia’s border; which explains 
why the most consistent versions of Russian patriotism and nationalism is imperial in a sense of 
permeating, penetrating and challenging existing borders. This makes any detachment of Russia 
from its neighbors incredibly harsh for Moscow. This explains why Russia so staunchly declines 
to accept the guilt of annexing Crimea and interfering into eastern Ukraine – the borders that are 
constitutive for Ukraine and the whole Europe are much less real (if existent at all) for Russia’s 
mainstream exemplified not only by the Kremlin, but also by the proverbial “Putin’s majority”. 
                                                        
15  Gressel, Gustav and Borja Lasheras, Francisco. 2016. How old Ukraine Threatens New 
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This only allows expansion; needless to say that Russia’s own borders are as important to it as to 
any other actor, especially if someone challenges them.   
In Russia, the very concept of the nation state faces existential challenges from 
alternative conceptualizations of Russian identity based on imperial underpinnings. As 
articulated through different discourses of Eurasianism and/or the ‘Russian world(s), Russia’s 
identity narratives contain the idea of ‘incompleteness’ of the country and its incongruence with 
‘genuine Russia’. Russia is not sympathetic at all with EU’s policy doing away with national 
sovereignties for the sake of a trans-national and cross-border dispersion of power; on the 
contrary, in many important respects Russia sticks to traditionalist, conservative policies, 
including in its immediate neighbourhood. The concept of the Russian world implies that 
Russian nation-building project cannot be confined to Russian domestic polity only; due to 
Russian speaking community widely dispersed all across the post-Soviet space Russian 
nationalism inevitably spills over Russian borders and becomes trans-national. This explains the 
high level of Russia’s insensitivity to what constitutes the sacrosanct core of European political 
order – the inviolability of post-Cold War borders. Paradoxically, Russia is a proponent of a 
return to a nation states system as a foundation of the whole structure of international relations, 
but Russia itself is far from being a nation state, with imperial temptations outweighing the idea 
of national integrity. 
 
Factors of Change 
There are six major factors that influence Russia’s neighborhood policy. With all due 
understanding of their different importance and long-term relevance, as well the likelihood of 
new destabilizing factors to emerge, I shall briefly discuss each of them from the viewpoint of 
their possible policy impacts on Russia’s neighborhood policy. 
The first set of factors reflects the complex dynamics within the EU and includes the 
divisive effects of the Eurozone crisis, including debates on Grexit; the refugee crisis that 
challenges the future of the Schengen zone; the mature Euroscepticism in the UK, France, the 
Netherlands, Hungary, and Poland, a tendency that includes the rise of far-right parties all across 
Europe; and the de-facto crisis of EU’s Eastern Partnership. 
These developments might be seen as beneficial for Russia since they question the 
integrity of the EU and weaken its ability to speak by a single voice in its eastern policy. Yet by 
supporting far-right and radical left parties in Europe, Russia in fact helps rocking the EU 
edifice, which, having in mind historical analogies, does not necessarily guarantee a higher level 
of security for Russia itself16. As a reaction to Russia’s policies some of its western neighbors 
had already undertaken measures to protect their interests in hard security domain, including 
common military units of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, an enhanced military cooperation 
among Visegrad Group countries and Ukraine17, as well as between Ukraine, Romania and 
Bulgaria. This creates a new, more complex structure of security relations in Europe’s east and 
means greater, not lesser, securitization in close vicinity of Russia’s borders.  
The second factor to be taken into account is the development within Ukraine that is 
characterized by a crisis of governance and the growing disappointment of a significant part of 
population in the ruling regime18. As in the first case, these domestic developments are largely 
seen as advantageous to Russia’s ambitions: they legitimize a key Russian argument of 
portraying Ukraine as an almost non-state with zero chances in Europe, and open up new 
prospects for manipulation and propaganda. The negative outcome of the Dutch referendum on 
April 6, 2016 only added score in Moscow’s favor. 
Yet, as I have mentioned earlier, it becomes obvious that Russia perceives the economic 
and administrative problems in Ukraine not so much in the context of bilateral relations with this 
“fraternal” neighbor, but largely as part of its acid polemics with the EU whose Eastern 
Partnership policy Moscow sees as a failure. “In fact, it led to the collapse of two major Eastern 
European states – Ukraine and Moldova. They were on the verge of the civil war. If the EU 
wants to apply this experience in Central Asia, it means another crisis is looming.”19 But Russia 
itself lacks a positive agenda to be pursued politically and economically towards countries that 
face harsh challenges in their transformation process. 
The third factor to consider is Russia’s Syria campaign that, in Moscow’s eyes, was 
supposed not only to divert attention from Russia’s Ukraine operation to a new, much more 
distant battlefield, but also to convince the West (both NATO and the EU) in the indispensability 
of forming a security alliance – even informal – with Russia against the radical Islamism and 
thus to break Russia’s current political isolation. The question of whether Russia achieved 
something in this regard remains a matter of interpretations.                                                         
16  Inozemtsev, Vladislav. 2016. Opasnoe ravenstvo. Pochemu mnogopoliarniy mir vediot k 
mirovym voinam. Slon, April 21. https://slon.ru/posts/66971 
17 EU Global Strategy: Role and Engagement of Eastern Partnership in European Security. 2016. 
Conference Report, March, Vilnius. 
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astern%20Partners%20in%20European%20Security_final.pdf 
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Carnegie Europe, April 11. http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=63293 
19 Kelin, Andrey. 2016. Russia is still searching for a new normal in its relations with the EU. 
Russia Direct, April 7. http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/russia-still-searching-new-normal-its-
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From a German perspective, “Russia was helpful in diffusing tensions with Iran, and has 
been helpful to the West over Syria. Only Ukraine remains a sticking point”20. Yet there is a 
chorus of voices who deem that Moscow failed to convert its investments in fighting a common 
threat in Syria into a basis for legitimizing Russia’s policy in Ukraine and thus get acceptance 
from the West of Russia’s great power status. This opinion is backed by a widely shared 
assessment of the Russian campaign in Syria as deceptive, brutal and ultimately having little to 
do with striking ISIS. The conclusion that many analysts deduced from Syria is that Putin’s 
regime becomes less cooperative and needs to be deterred in other areas where Russia’s interest 
might intersect with those of the West21.  
Therefore, Russia is eager to take advantage of its operation in Syria for playing a key role in international war on terror and thus convincing the West to accept Russia in this capacity. Yet so far Russia can’t convert the benefits of its Syria campaign into policy capital to be used in bargaining with the EU and NATO in the common neighbourhood. In particular, reactions from Russia’s military allies to the operation in Syria show a lack of unified position within the Collective Security Treaty Organization.  
  The fourth factor is Russia’s conflict with Turkey that was detrimental for Russia’s 
neighborhood policy due to several reasons. First, it created a new zone of tensions with a 
NATO member state and an influential actor in what Russia considers to be its “near abroad”. 
On this account Russia might face an additional lobbyist for Georgia and Ukraine in NATO22. 
Second, Russia lost Turkey as a constructive interlocutor by the role it played after the 2008 war 
between Russia and Georgia. Moreover, Russia’s conflict with Turkey gave rise to a new 
discourse on a possible interest of the latter in strengthening its security relations with countries 
(like Ukraine, but also Poland and Baltic states)23 that feel threatened by Russia.24 
The fifth factor is the sharpening of the armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh in April 
2016. Russia’s major advantage, almost consensually recognized by most international 
observers, is its mediation role and brokering resources that it applied in the absence of a clear                                                         
20  Steinmeier: It’s Time to Talk. 2016. Handelsblatt, April 22. 
https://global.handelsblatt.com/edition/415/ressort/politics/article/steinmeier-its-time-to-talk 
21 Czuperski, Maks; Eliot Higgins, Frederic Hof, Ben Nimmo, John Herbst. 2016. Destruct. 
Deceive. Destroy. Putin’ at War in Syria. Atlantic Council. 
http://publications.atlanticcouncil.org/distract-deceive-destroy/ 
22 Turkey Supports Georgia NATO Membership. Daily News, February 17, 2016, available at 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-supports-georgias-nato-
membership.aspx?pageID=238&nID=95342&NewsCatID=355 
23 Umland, Andreas. 2016. An East European – Turkish Pact against Russian Neo-imperialism. 
Turkish Policy Quarterly, April 22. http://turkishpolicy.com/blog/13/an-east-european-
turkish-pact-against-russian-neo-imperialism 
24 See chapter by Alaranta in this report 
EU policy25. Yet the conflict poses a strong political challenge to Moscow’s stand in the whole 
South Caucasus, which is basically due to Russia’s traditional policy of supplying military 
armament to both Armenia and Azerbaijan. Yerevan’s disillusionment with this dubious 
approach “leaves it with the imperative for a wholesale revision of its foreign policy. The flare-
up has also spurred a debate among the Armenian public: sacrificing democracy for security has 
resulted in less, not more security”26. 
The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh in fact raised the price of Armenia’s loyalty to Russia.  
According to the information leaked from the Russian Embassy in Yerevan, “the work here 
became more complicated… If earlier Russia could do its job on the basis of confidence, now it 
won’t work. In four days (of hostilities with Azerbaijan in April 2016 – A.M.) the Armenians 
have lost their children and young countrymen” 27, and are much more demanding towards 
Russia. Indeed, the April 2016 resumption of hostilities has “provoked an unprecedented 
outburst of skepticism to Eurasian integration in Armenia and the reciprocal skepticism to 
Armenia in Belarus and Kazakhstan. The failure of the Minsk process could equalize Russia 
with all other parties and, on the contrary, increase the roles of Turkey and Iran… The loss of 
Nagorno Karabakh can draw a thick line in Russian – Armenian alliance, especially taking into 
account that for Azerbaijan friendship with Russia in this case won’t be that indispensable”28. 
Therefore, Russia’s policy towards Azerbaijan is also on trial. There are voices in 
Moscow claiming that “Azerbaijan, undoubtedly, shouldn’t become a second Georgia for us. We 
should avoid losing it; moreover Azerbaijan is much stronger than Georgia, and it has behind it 
Turkey, whose strengthening role in the whole Caucasus, up to Dagestan, isn’t the best 
option”29. Again, we see that security environment in this particular segment of Russia’s sphere 
of interests becomes increasingly more complex and less easy to deal with. 
The sixth factor is the toughening of regime of power within Russia, with regular 
repressions against opposition, decreasing media freedom, centralization of government and 
eradication of political pluralism. This devolution of Putin’s regime that Russian independent 
analysts overtly compare with the well-known Soviet models might be disadvantageous to the 
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prospects of Russia’s normative leadership in the post-Soviet world. In the meantime it is exactly 
this growing autarchy that decreases the sensitivity to the application of military force within the 
society and makes it more compliant with the securitized vision of the neighborhood. One may 
agree that as a result of authoritarian rule, “Russia is neither more secure, prosperous nor 
respected abroad than before; if anything the Kremlin’s domestic support has consolidated, but if 
the annexation of Crimea was the most rational way of achieving that we face a far bigger 
problem with Russia than if we suggest that the decision was based on miscalculation”30.  
 
Windows of opportunity 
On a general note, Russia perceives itself as being intentionally marginalized by a malign 
West, yet challenging this reality has proven to be costly and ultimately unsustainable, as the 
annexation of Crimea made has clear. Hence, Russia tries to hammer out its own policy tools 
that would smooth out the troubles Russia faces in its relations with the West.  
In spite of a generally negative background of Russia – EU interactions in the common 
neighborhood, there are some glimpses of hope for a more cooperative relationship. Russia 
shows some signs of readiness to tone down its militant posture in the Ukraine conflict. For 
example, Putin does not exclude the deployment of peacekeepers under the aegis of the OSCE in 
the frontline zone31 – an option that has been discussed earlier in fall 2014 by a US—Russia 
group of experts moderated by the Finnish Foreign Ministry32. There might be – hypothetically –
some chances for a consensus between Russia and the West (the EU and NATO) on a future 
status of Ukraine comparable to that one of Switzerland’s or Austria’s neutrality33. 
As mentioned above, Russia’s compliance might be grounded in the due understanding of 
a heavy financial burden of sustaining ailing economies of break-away territories for Russian 
budget. This is particularly the case of Transnistria: Moscow nowadays is reluctant to keep 
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financing this secessionist part of Moldova and even reproaches its leaders for inefficiency34. 
This contains a lucid message to Donbas as well, strengthened by Russia’s verbal commitment to 
reintegration of this region to Ukraine. The postponement of referendum in South Ossetia on 
joining Russia from 2016 to 2017 is also a sign of Russia’s search for a wider space of 
maneuvering and reluctance to rush with decisions that might be detrimental for its relations with 
Georgia and – unavoidably – the EU. 
 The exchange in May 2016 of Nadezhda Savchenko, a Ukrainian pilot sentenced in 
Russia, for two Russian military officers jailed in Ukraine for their participation in military 
operations in Donbas, further complicated Moscow’s stand on Ukraine and exposed its 
vulnerability. Observers have noted a strong contrast between highly emotional comeback of 
Savchenko to Kyiv, including her immediate audience with President Poroshenko, and an almost 
silenced return of the two Russians to Moscow. The two drastically dissimilar contexts of the 
prisoners’ swap lucidly illustrates Russia’s role as a foreign encroacher and Ukraine’s role as a 
victim of intrusion, which Russia de-facto acknowledged. The absence of celebratory and 
triumphalist notes in Russia’s narrative of the swap attests to the diminishing appeal of 
belligerent approaches in the Kremlin’s toolkit.     
 
Conclusion 
Russia seems to slowly learning lessons of its policy towards Ukraine, and appears to 
gradually understand the dear price it pays for Crimea and Donbas. As a way out of the current 
stalemate, the Kremlin resorts to a rather traditional tool of playing down with the importance of 
political issues in relations with the EU, and prioritizing its depoliticized (financial, economic, 
administrative and managerial) aspects. Nevertheless, the refocusing on non-political 
integrationists projects with the EU and common neighbours does not go as far as to 
relinquishing Moscow’s cherished doctrine of vital zones of interests and spheres of influence. 
As this analysis has shown, Russia’s neighbourhood policy is very much grounded in 
capitalization on domestic weakness of the EU, as well as on vulnerabilities of EaP countries.  
In the absence of even relative consensus on political issues depoliticized projects can be 
only temporary fixtures. However, in a practical sense, at certain point the EU might indeed 
engage with some kind of technical and, perhaps initially, semi-official contacts with the EEU, 
The rationale for that could lie in the fact that the EEU, with all duly understood Russia-
centrism, includes a group of other post-Soviet countries that are both dependent on Russia and                                                         
34 Tischenko, Mikhail. 2016. Po susekam. Kak Rossiya finansiruet Pridnestrovie v krizis. Slon, 
April 20. https://slon.ru/posts/66931  
eager to have a greater freedom of hands in their outside communications and interactions. Some 
of them have their own opinions that might contravene Russia’s policies – for example, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus are much more inclined to cooperate with Azerbaijan than incorporate 
Armenia in common institutions. EU’s contacts with the EEU would not mean any solidarity 
with Russia or support for its policy towards Ukraine; these contacts might imply that the EU 
treats Russia as just one of Eurasian countries in a group of its equally important eastern 
neighbours. 
This strategy might make sense, especially bearing in mind that cultural and political 
distance between most of the post-Soviet borderlands and Russia won’t diminish in the 
foreseeable future. Even countries favourable to the EEU either prefer to limit this project to a 
purely economic inter-governmental coordination mechanism (Kazakhstan and Belarus), or are 
forced to accept Russia's sphere of influence because of security vulnerabilities (Armenia). A 
significant divergence exists between nation-building projects in neighboring countries and 
Russia for whom strong national identities are conceptual challengers to its major foreign policy 
platforms, including the civilizational concept of Eurasianism, the Russian world doctrine, and 
the neo-Soviet revisionism. In all neighboring countries there are multiple local discourses of 
othering Russia as an external actor that needs to be kept at a certain distance and even counter-
balanced. It is in the best interests of the EU to help both members of the EEU and signatories of 
the Association Agreements to protect this distance according to their own needs and visions. 
This strategy would be beneficial for maintaining political pluralism in the post-Soviet space and 
keeping alive alternatives to Russia’s domination. 
